(with Rajiv Vohra), Econometrica 83, 977–1011, 2015. Online Appendix.
Summary. We propose a definition of farsighted stability in coalitional games, in the spirit of von Neumann-Morgenstern stability and its modification by Harsanyi. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a farsighted stable set containing just a single-payoff allocation. We then conduct a comprehensive analysis of the existence and structure of farsighted stable sets in simple games.
(with Tapan Mitra), Journal of Economic Theory 147, 833–849, 2012.
Summary. We examine whether the Phelps–Koopmans theorem is valid in models with nonconvex production technologies. Dedicated to the memory of David Cass: mentor, friend and an extraordinary economic theorist.
(with Joan Esteban), Econometrica 62, 819–851, 1994.
Summary. This paper is concerned with the conceptualization and measurement of polarization. Suppose that a population is grouped into significantly-sized “clusters’,” such that each cluster is “similar” in terms of the attributes of its members, but different clusters have “dissimilar” attributes. In that case we would say that the society is “polarized.” We study these intuitive criteria carefully, and provide a theory of measurement.