Games and Economic Behavior 6, 162-177, 1994.
Summary. Recent literature in the theory of dynamic games addresses renegotiatioin-proof equilibria, For repeated games, I analyze the limit of renegotiation-proof equilibrium sets as discounting vanishes. The main result states that such limit sets must either be singletons or belong to the Pareto frontier of the convex hull of the feasible set of the stage game payoffs.
(with Partha Dasgupta), Economic Journal 97, 177-188, 1987.
Summary. This is the second part of a two-part article which develops a theory of involuntary unemployment and the incidence of undernourishment, relates these in turn to the production and distribution of income, and ultimately to the distribution of productive assets. In this part, we study policy options such as land reform.
(with Tapan Mitra), in Sugata Marjit and Meenakshi Rajeev (eds), Emerging Issues in Economic Development: A Contemporary Theoretical Perspective: Essays in Honour of Dipankar Dasgupta & Amitava Bose, Oxford University Press, 2012.
Summary. We study the celebrated Phelps-Koopmans theorem in environments with nonconvex production technologies. We argue that a robust failure of the theorem occurs in such environments. Specifically, we prove that the Phelps-Koopmans theorem must fail whenever the net output of the aggregate production function f(x), given by f(x) − x, is increasing in any region between the golden rule and the maximum sustainable capital stock.